An outline is presented of some of the main elements of an electron accelerator radiological safety program. The discussion includes types of accelerator facilities, types of radiations to be anticipated, activity induced in components, air and water, and production of toxic gases. Concepts of radiation shielding design are briefly discussed and organizational aspects are considered as an integral part of the overall safety program.
Types of Accelerator Installations
The great majority of electron linear accelerator installations fall conveniently into four categories: ( MeV (4) Nuclear and particle research 20 -28000 MeV. Categories (1) and (2) are mature, in that the equipment specifications have stabilized enough so that one model is easily comparable with another. As a consequence their installations tend to be quite similar and safety practices are quite standardized. On the other hand, categories (3) and (4) tend more to be customized and safety needs must be re-thought from the ground up for each new facility. This paper will try to say something applicable to all of these categories, except that those who work at one of the special categories (3) or (4) may find it the most useful.
A good way to conceptualize an accelerator's ability to generate radiological problems is to look at two parameters, the maximum electron energy Eo (MeV) and the maximum beam power P (kW). I choose P rather than current, because, above a certain energy some kinds of radiation tend to become independent of energy for the same beam power delivered to the target. Unless the machine is very unusual, it will lie, to within a small factor, near the straight line on Fig. 1 . The points represent category (4) . Categories (1) and (2) (d) aural warning (e) run/safe switches (f) permanent radiation monitors (6) Location and interlocking of klystrons. All of these provisions are best incorporated into the initial plans so that elegant solutions are found rather than having improvisations forced upon you later. Technical details can be found in references below. 19 The most important points to be made are: (1) the early plans should have safety cast into them, along with the concrete; and (2) a relationship be developed between the facility management and the radiation-safety personnel, which will be carried over to the period of operation.
The NCRP has recommended the use of Occupancy and Use Factors in conjunction with a Workload for shielding of medical accelerators. This practice has proved quite satisfactory over a period of many years and I believe it can well be adapted for industrial applications. An estimate of the on-time per 40-hour week should be made. For radiographic installations, 10 h per 40 h week is suggested, which is an attempt to take into account the setup times. For radiation processing or research, 40 hours per 40-hour work week would probably be more appropriate. Shielding needs can then be estimated from a plan of the facility and a knowledge of the radiations produced. The shielding of the primary bremsstrahlung is quite straightforward (Fig. 5 ), but scattered and leakage radiation are also significant and must be considered (see Fig. 6 ). 
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The threshold for air activation is 10.55 MeV. Even where present, air activation is not normally a limiting factor; normal air circulation is generally sufficient to reduce exposures from activated air well below those from activated components. The dominant radionuclides are 13N and 150 (Ti2 = 9.96 m and 123 s, respectively). Air is activated by photonuclear reactions induced by bremsstrahlung, not by the primary electrons. Reduction of the amount of air that is irradiated will reduce the activity. Local lead shielding is quite effective in reducing the amount of stray radiation and consequently will reduce the amount of air activation, toxic gas formation and radiation damage.
Toxic gas production (ozone and oxides of nitrogen) will occur in considerable amounts where the primary electron beam is brought into the air. Of the gases produced, ozone will almost always be the limiting factor, owing to its much lower Threshold Limit Value (TLV: 0.1 ppm), high radiolytic yield and chemical reactivity. The amount produced is roughly proportional to the integral dose given to the air and this is largest if the electron beam is extracted, regardless of its energy. On the other hand, at medical and radiographic facilities, where the electrons are completely stopped within the accelerator system, toxic gases are rarely of any significance. The human nose can detect levels in the range 0.02 -0.05 ppm. This is below the Threshold Limit Value, so if ozone is only rarely detected, the facility may be assumed to be safe with regard to radiogenic toxic gases. If the odor is strong or frequently detected, an assessment should be made with monitoring equipment and measures, such as improved ventilation or limiting personnel access, should be implemented.
To conclude this catalog of radiation hazards, it should be noted that RF equipment also emits X-rays. Klystrons are the most prominent example because they invariably serve as the RF power source for facilities operating above 10-15 MeV. They resemble an ordinary X-ray tube in the manner in which they produce radiation. The location, shielding and interlocking of klystrons should be planned at the same time as the rest of the radiation facility. Vacuum RF cavities are also strong X-ray sources, and these should be carefully assessed. These radiations are erratic and almost impossible to predict because they depend on changing microscopic surface conditions. Their X-ray output is also a strong function of the RF power applied to them (a dose rate dependence on the 5th power of the applied RF power has been observed at SLAC).
Safety Organization
The matters discussed thus far are mostly physical safety provisions. These of course are essential. But an effective safety program depends just as much on the personnel, their attitudes and habits.
As far as formal organization is concerned, there is no single organization chart that is necessarily best, even for a specific situation. Generally it is an extension of the organizational philosophy that has developed in the parent organization, except in the unusual case where a brand new independent facility is established. are rewritten at the startup of each running cycle and are frequently modified in mid-cycle. These BAS's must be approved by radiation safety personnel and operations personnel before they are implemented. Thus the philosophy of dual-responsibility, or checks and balances, is automatically implemented on this level. Because of the constant change at a large experimental facility such as SLAC all of these documents are maintained in a computer system and, no matter how involved, a new copy can be generated on very short notice. Even where the needs are quite modest, use of a word processor to edit and print the radiation safety manual may be quite helpful.
Whether or not the radiation-safety personnel are formally integrated together with the other forms of occupational safety is probably best determined by each organization and may depend on the personalities involved as much as anything. Regardless of this it is salutary to attempt some kind of balance. so that undue emphasis is not given to radiation safety at the expense of other kinds. Bear in mind that serious radiation accidents have occurred less frequently than other types of occupational accidents around radiation facilities. At many, electrocution, poisoning or mechanical injury may be potentially greater hazards. Where the organizational safety is integrated, such imbalances are less likely to occur. Where radiation safety is maintained as a separate department, it is up to management to see that the right amount of attention is given to each aspect of safety.
